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“[L]aw is language and, therefore, for law to be clear, the language of 
the law must be clear.”1  The individuals who draft statutes are held to a high 
standard of clarity because their choice of language creates the law.2  It is, 
however, impossible for anyone to anticipate every question that word 
choice or syntax can raise.3  What, then, does a lawyer, a judge, or a justice 
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attorney since 2004 and is admitted to practice in New Jersey and New York; she is a graduate 
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the area of Sales and Use Tax, which is reflected in the discussion of in pari materia below.1  
Terri LeClercq, Doctrine of the Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass of Ambiguous 
Modifiers, 2 LEGAL WRITING INST. 81 (1996). 
 2   Id. at 85. 
 3   Id.  
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do when a statute is not clear? 
The United States Supreme Court recently explained that the proper 
starting point for a court in a statutory interpretation dispute “lies in a careful 
examination of the ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself.”4  If that 
examination “yields a clear answer, judges must stop,”5 lest the legislative 
history “be used to ‘muddy’ the meaning of ‘clear statutory language.’”6   
 Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has said, “[w]e begin with 
the statute’s plain language, which is the ‘best indicator’ of legislative 
intent.”7  Generally, the “words and phrases shall be read and construed with 
their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 
legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, be 
given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of 
the language.”8 
A given act may consist of “many different words, passages, 
provisions, and sections.”9  Courts “must determine whether a particular 
word, passage, provision, or section is relevant to and probative of an act’s 
construction” and “how much of a statute’s context is relevant to and 
probative of the final determination of legislative intent or statutory 
meaning.”10 
If the plain language of the statute leads to a “clear and unambiguous 
result,” then the court’s interpretive process is over.11  If, however, there is 
ambiguity in the statute, the plain reading leads to an absurd result, or the 
overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language, then a court may 
resort to extrinsic evidence.12 
A court does not conclude that an ambiguity exists solely on the basis 
that there is a disagreement about what the words convey.  Instead, the court 
must assess the reasonableness of the positions of the parties based on its 
own review of the language in question.13  Once a court determines that 
statutory interpretation is required, it may employ a number of different 
 
 4   Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (citing 
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885 (2011)). 
 5   Id. (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 119 S. Ct. 755 (1999)). 
 6   Id. (citing Milner v. Department of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011)). 
 7   State v. Rodriguez, 238 N.J. 105, 113–14 (2019) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 
477, 492 (2005)). 
 8   N.J.S.A. § 1:1-1 (West 2019). 
 9   NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 
47:2 (7th ed. 2019). 
 10   Id. (footnote omitted). 
 11   State v. Rodriguez, 238 N.J. 105, 113–14 (2019) (citing Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick 
LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016) (quoting Richardson v. PFRS, 192 N.J. 189 (2007))). 
 12   Id. (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492–93 (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. 
Faugno, 182 N.J. 64 (2004))).  
 13   State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 178–79 (2010). 
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techniques.  They are not universally embraced. 
It has, for example, been suggested that canons of statutory 
interpretation provide only limited assistance in the search for the meaning 
of a statute, and that there exist “canons, both in Latin and in English, which 
will support almost any approach to interpretation which a court wishes to 
adopt.”14  Karl Llewellyn has long been cited for the proposition that for each 
and every canon, there is an equal and opposite canon.15 
The question fairly arises: are the details of statutory construction, and 
the canons of statutory interpretation, of interest only to those toiling in the 
relative obscurity of statutory drafting? 
In early 2018, national news sources reported that the family-owned 
independent Oakhurst Dairy, located in Portland, Maine, had settled an 
overtime dispute with its truck drivers by agreeing to pay $5 million to the 
drivers in a dispute “that hinged entirely on the lack of an Oxford comma in 
state law.”16  The dispute gained “international notoriety” when the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that the missing 
comma created sufficient uncertainty to side with the drivers.17  It was noted 
that the resolution of the matter by the parties meant that “there will be no 
ruling from the land’s highest courts on whether the Oxford comma—the 
often-skipped second comma in a series like ‘A, B, and C’—is an 
unnecessary nuisance or a sacred defender of clarity, as its fans and 
detractors endlessly debate.”18 
Other recent cases, decided by both federal and New Jersey state courts, 
received far less attention than the Oakhurst Dairy matter, but they served as 
frequent examples of the enduring viability of the canons of statutory 
interpretation. 
We examine below selected examples of statutory interpretation using 
“intrinsic” sources: review and analysis of the words and the syntax, a 
consideration of the plain or technical meaning of the words, as well as 
punctuation and grammar rules.  We also examine selected examples of 
interpretation using “extrinsic” sources: a review of aspects of the legislative 
process pertaining to the enactment of the statute under consideration, the 
circumstances before and during enactment, as well as post-enactment 
 
 14   Morris-Sussex Area Co. v. Hopatcong Borough, 15 N.J. Tax 438, 443 (1996) (citation 
omitted). 
 15   Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (listing 
twenty-eight canons of statutory interpretation and their opposites). 
 16   Daniel Victor, Oxford Comma Dispute is Settled as Maine Drivers Get $5 Million, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/us/oxford-comma-
maine.html. 
 17   Id. 
 18   Id. 
THARNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2020  2:04 AM 
288 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
events and interpretations. 
The following pages certainly do not, nor could they, contain an 
exhaustive review of this area.  Instead, we focus on issues of statutory 
interpretation that arose in the ordinary course of the recent work of the New 
Jersey Law Revision Commission, whose statutory mandate requires that it 
promote and encourage the clarification and simplification of New Jersey’s 
law, its better adaptation to present social needs, and secure the better 
administration of justice.19 
I. INTRINSIC AIDS TO INTERPRETATION 
“Intrinsic” aids for interpretation relate to the language 
of a statute itself. Courts have called intrinsic aids “technical 
rules of statutory construction,” and aids which “arise from 
the composition and structure of [an] act.” However they are 
described, intrinsic aids generally are the first resource to 
which courts turn to construe an ambiguous statute . . . . 
These “intrinsic” aids for construction focus attention on a 
statute’s text, and properly reflect the primacy of the 
legislature’s own use of language. [footnotes omitted]20 
A. The Doctrine of the Last Antecedent 
As both English syntax and the law have become more complicated, so 
too has the problem of ascertaining the intent or meaning of a statute.21  
Linguists have observed that the English language has a tendency to 
“cluster,” or “group,” words next to each other that can be interpreted by 
readers to form a unit of thought.22  In the late 1880’s, Jabez Gridley 
Sutherland analyzed complicated and litigated statutes in an attempt to 
resolve future problems of statutory interpretation.23  One result of 
Sutherland’s work was his creation of a grammar and punctuation rule that 
would become known as the doctrine of the last antecedent.24  That doctrine 
provides, in relevant part, that, 
 
 
 19   N.J.S.A. § 1:12A-8 (West 2019).  
 20   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 47:1. 
 21   LeClercq, supra note 1, at 86. 
 22   Id. at 87. (citing Lyn Frazier, Syntactic Complexity, in NATURAL LANGUAGE PARSING 
135 (David Dowty et. al. eds., 1985)). 
 23   Id. at 86–87. Jabez Sutherland authored SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
(1st ed. 1891). 
 24   Id. at 87. This doctrine is also known as “the last antecedent rule,” “the rule of last 
antecedent,” and ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia origin 
(relative words must ordinarily be referred to the last antecedent, the last antecedent being the 
last word which can be made an antecedent so as to give a meaning). 
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[r]eferential and qualifying phrases, where no contrary 
intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. The last 
antecedent is the “last word, phrase, or clause that can be 
made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the 
sentence.” Thus a proviso usually applies to the provision or 
clause immediately preceding it . . . .25 
Although the doctrine is not the law and is not uniformly accepted, its 
strength as an interpretive tool is attributed to the fact that “the last 
antecedent rule is merely another aid to [the discovery of] . . . intent or 
meaning [of a statute], and [that it] is not inflexible and uniformly binding.”26 
The doctrine provides that, “where the sense of an entire act requires 
that a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding or even 
succeeding sections, the qualifying word or phrase is not restricted to its 
immediate antecedent . . . .”27  The flexibility incorporated in the doctrine 
has been viewed by some as one of its fundamental weaknesses.28  Critics 
have remarked that, “[b]ecause the question of whether to apply [the 
doctrine] essentially amounts to a coin toss, it seems implausible to rely on 
it as a method of inferring actual congressional intent or meaning.”29  Despite 
its detractors, use of the doctrine increases in the United States Supreme 
Court, the federal Circuit Courts,30 and the New Jersey Judiciary.31 
Beginning in 1799, when the United States Supreme Court interpreted 
statutes that included a list of terms followed by a limiting clause, the Court 
referred in passing to the interpretive strategy known as “the doctrine of the 
last antecedent.”32  In 2003, however, the doctrine seemingly achieved an 
 
 25   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 47:33 (7th ed. 2019) (footnotes omitted). 
 26   Id. (emphasis added) (citing Borenstein v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 919 F.3d 746 
(2d Cir. 2019) and Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (2003) (“[t]he last antecedent rule is not 
absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning, but construing a statue 
in accord with the rule is quite sensible as a matter of grammar.”); and see LeClercq, supra 
note 1, at 89 (discussing that linguistic principles are neither rules nor the law; rather, the 
principles of linguistics help readers infer meaning).  
 27   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 47:33. (citing U.S. v. Babbit, 66 U.S. 55 (1861); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mun, 751 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2014); In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 
F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2012); Shendock v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 893 F.2d 
1458 (3d Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Brandenburg, 144 F.2d 656 (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1944)). 
 28   Joseph Kimble, The Doctrine of the Last Antecedent, the Example in Barnhart, Why 
Both are Weak, and How Textualism Postures, 16 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 5, 8 (2014–15) 
(quoting Jeremy Ross, A Rule of Last Resort: A History of the Doctrine of the Last Antecedent 
in the United States Supreme Court, 39 SW. L. REV. 325, 336 (2009)). 
 29   Id. 
 30   Id. at 8. 
 31   See, e.g., State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475, 484 (2008); and, C.R. v. M.T., No. A-
0139018T4, 2019 N.J. Super LEXIS 158, at *7–9 (App. Div. Nov. 13, 2019). 
 32   Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 963 (2016) (citing Sims Lessee v. Irvine, 3 
Dall. 425 (1799); FTC v. Mandel Brothers Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 n. 4 (1959); Barnhart v. 
Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)). 
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increase in status when it was announced as a grammatical rule in Barnhart 
v. Thomas.33 
In Barnhart, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal Social Security 
Income (“SSI”) statutes, determining whether an applicant was eligible for 
benefits.34  For purposes of collecting SSI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A) and 
1382c(a)(3)(B) provide that a person is disabled “only if his physical or 
mental impairment . . . [is] of such severity that he is not only unable to do 
his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work 
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists 
in the national economy.”35 
The Court, after analyzing the syntax, determined that the statutes 
establish two requirements.36  An impairment must render the individual 
“unable to do his previous work” and must also preclude the individual from 
“engag[ing] in any other kind of substantial gainful work.”37  Invoking the 
“rule” of the last antecedent, the Court found that the clause “which exists in 
the national economy” qualifies the latter requirement.38  Pursuant to this 
newly announced “rule:” 
A limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be 
read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it 
immediately follows . . . . While this rule is not an absolute 
and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning, 
we have said that construing a statute in accord with the rule 
is “quite sensible as a matter of grammar.”39 
Doing so “reflects the basic intuition that when a modifier appears at 
the end of a list, it is easier to apply that modifier only to the item directly 
before it.”40 
Thirteen years after the Barnhart decision, in Lockhart v. United States, 
the Supreme Court considered a case in which the defendant pled guilty in 
federal court to the possession of child pornography.41  The defendant had a 
prior state conviction for first-degree sexual abuse involving his adult 
girlfriend.42  His pre-sentence report concluded that he was subject to a ten-
year mandatory minimum sentence.43  The report also noted that a statutory 
 
 33   Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26. 
 34   Id. at 20.  
 35   Id. 
 36   Id. 
 37   Id. 
 38   Id. 
 39   Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 40   Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 963 (2016). 
 41   Id.  
 42   Id. at 960. 
 43   Id. 
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sentence enhancement was triggered by the defendant’s prior state 
convictions for crimes “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or 
abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.”44 
The defendant argued that the limiting phrase, “involving a minor or 
ward,” applied to all three crimes.45  The District Court disagreed.46  The 
Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.47  After 
examining the internal logic of the statute, its place in the overall statutory 
scheme, and the legislative history, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
doctrine of the last antecedent was well supported by the context and 
structure of the statute.48 
Although the last New Jersey Supreme Court case discussing the 
doctrine of the last antecedent was State v. Gelman,49 decided in 2008, the 
New Jersey Appellate Division has considered more recent cases invoking 
the doctrine.  Since the Court in Gelman ultimately resolved the statutory 
ambiguity in favor of the defendant under the doctrine of lenity,50 




 44   Id. (emphasis added). The italicized portion of the statute is commonly referred to as 
the “limiting phrase,” “limiting clause,” or the “qualifying phrase.”  
 45   Id. (emphasis added). 
 46   Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 960. 
 47   Id. at 960. The Eighth Circuit interpreted the qualifying phrase “involving a minor or 
ward” to apply to each of the offenses.  
 48   Id. at 960, 968. 
 49   State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475 (2008). This doctrine was subsequently discussed by 
the Appellate Division in Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of 
Middletown, 403 N.J. Super. 201 (App. Div. 2008) (confirming that where no contrary 
intention appears, qualifying words refer solely to the last antecedent); Alexander v. Bd. of 
Rev., 405 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 2009) (explaining that if the modifier is intended to 
relate to more than the last antecedent, a “comma” is used to set off the modifier from the 
entire series); Maccarone v. State, 2011 WL 2478636 (App. Div. Jun. 23, 2011) (finding that 
the use of a semicolon indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to separate the first 
group in the statutory list from those set forth in the modifying clause); Mahwah Realty Assoc. 
v. Twp. of Mahwah, 430 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 2013) (noting that in the absence of 
intrinsic or extrinsic evidence to the contrary, the court must logically interpret a statute 
according to its literal wording and natural connotation); and, Kamienski v. State, Dept. of 
Treas., 451 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 2017) following State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475, 484 
(2008) (the doctrine of last antecedent holds that unless a contrary intention otherwise 
appears, a qualifying phrase within a statute refers to the last antecedent phrase). In addition, 
the doctrine was most recently discussed by the Tax Court in  Bentz v. Twp. of Little Egg 
Harbor, 30 N.J. Tax 530 (Tax 2018) (noting that the general rule of statutory construction is 
that the modifying phrase applies to the last antecedent phrase, absent contrary intent and the 
use of a comma to separate a modifier from an antecedent phrase indicates an intent to apply 
the modifier to all previous antecedent phrases).  
 50   Gelman, 195 N.J. at 497 (noting that Justice Rivera-Soto dissented, adopted an 
interpretation of the statute similar to the one proffered by the State).  
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In State v. Malik, the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree 
aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to a ten-year prison term subject to 
the “No Early Release Act” (NERA).51  The defendant appealed.52  He argued 
that he had asked the trial court judge to charge the jury with the definition 
of “mentally incapacitated” set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(i).53  He withdrew 
the request after the trial court said that it did not see how it would assist him 
and that the State had not charged mentally incapacitated in the indictment.54  
The Appellate Division, however, discussed this defined term in its opinion. 
The Appellate Division observed that the indictment was predicated 
upon the fact that the defendant “knew” or “should have known” that the 
victim was “physically helpless.”55  The State offered evidence that the 
victim had voluntarily consumed alcohol and proffered that her intoxicated 
state proved that she met the definition of “physically helpless” and not 
“mentally incapacitated.”56  In considering the propriety of a “mental 
incapacitation” charge, the court examined the definition set forth in N.J.S.A. 
2C:14-1(i),57 which defines “mentally incapacitated” as “that condition in 
which a person is rendered temporarily incapable of understanding or 
controlling his conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, 
intoxicant, or other substance administered to that person without his prior 
knowledge or consent . . . .”58 
The court determined that “[t]here was no evidence that [the victim] 
ingested any substance without her knowledge or consent, or under any 
situation of which she did not have knowledge or control.”59  Absent such 
proof, the court determined that it would have been improper and confusing 
to the jury to include this definition in a jury charge.60  The court also 
determined that the phrase “administered to that person without his prior 
knowledge or consent” qualified all four statutory terms: narcotics, 
 
 51   State v. Malik, No. A-2683-16T2, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2697, at *1 (Super. 
Ct. App. Div. Dec. 10, 2018). 
 52   Id. 
 53   Id. at *9. The defendant raised seven points in his appellate brief. Only point IV, 
however, is germane to the discussion raised herein. The other six points raised in the 
defendant’s brief have been omitted from this discussion. 
 54   Id. 
 55   Id. at *10. 
 56   Id. See N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(h) (defining “physically helpless” as a “condition in which 
a person is unconscious or is physically unable to flee or is physically unable to communicate 
unwillingness to act”).  
 57  State v. Malik, No. A-2683-16T2, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2697, at *1, *28 
(Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 10, 2018). 
 58   Id. (emphasis added). 
 59   Id. at *28–*29. 
 60   Id. at *29. 
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anesthetics, intoxicants and other substances.61  This reading of the statute 
limits the term “mentally incapacitated” to victims that are rendered 
temporarily incapable of understanding or controlling their conduct only 
when they are administered substances without their prior knowledge or 
consent. 
Eleven months later, the Appellate Division examined the same statute, 
and the result was an entirely different interpretation.62   In C.R. v. M.T., the 
plaintiff commenced an action under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection 
Act (SASPA) to restrain the defendant from having any communication or 
contact with her.63  The parties did not dispute that sexual contact occurred.64  
After hearing the testimony of the parties, the trial court found the parties’ 
competing versions of the events to be “equally plausible,” determining, as 
a result, that the plaintiff failed to prove that her version was more likely true 
than defendant’s.65  The plaintiff appealed.66 
The Appellate Division noted that the “factual dispute about consent 
turned on whether there was a ground upon which it could be found [that the] 
plaintiff was incapable of consenting.”67  A sexual assault victim is “one 
whom the actor knew or should have known was,” among other things, 
“mentally incapacitated.”68 
The court in C.R. recognized that one reading of the statute “might 
suggest a requirement that the alleged victim prove her involuntary 
intoxication, that is, that she ingested intoxicants administered to [her] 
without [her] prior knowledge or consent.”69 
The court “engage[d] the doctrine of the last antecedent” after noting 
that the Legislature listed the substances that could generate mental 
incapacity and followed them with a qualifying phrase.70  The court 
emphasized the absence of a comma after the last antecedent “other 
substance.”71  It determined that the absence of this comma, in conjunction 
with the doctrine of last antecedent, “requires our conclusion that the 
 
 61   See Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 970; see also Series Qualifier Canon, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This method of interpretation is predicated upon 
the “Series Qualifier Canon.”  
 62   C.R. v. M.T., 461 N.J. Super. 341 (App. Div. Nov. 13, 2019). 
 63   Id. at 343; see also N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:14-13 to 21. 
 64   C.R., 461 N.J. Super. at 343. 
 65   Id. at 346. 
 66   Id. at 343. 
 67   Id. 
 68   Id. (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(7)). 
 69   Id. at 347; see also State v. Malik, No. A-2683-16T2, 2018 WL 6441507, at *1 (App. 
Div. Dec. 10, 2018). 
 70   C.R. v. M.T., 461 N.J. Super. 341, 348 (App. Div. Nov. 13, 2019). 
 71   Id. 
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qualifying phrase applies only to ‘other substances’ and not [the term] 
‘intoxicant.’”72  The court further reasoned that the Legislature intended to 
place the comma where it was.73  Although the comma is “a mere punctuation 
mark to be sure, [its presence] would grammatically call for a different 
result.”74  The court “confidently conclude[d] that the Legislature’s omission 
of a comma after ‘other substance’ was intended to invoke the doctrine of 
the last antecedent in the construction of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(i), thereby 
conveying the Legislature’s intent that the phrase would qualify only ‘other 
substance.’”75 
Textual analysis of the term “mentally incapacitated,” as defined in 
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(i), is subject to competing, plausible interpretations.  One 
would find that an individual was mentally incapacitated only if he or she 
was administered a narcotic, anesthetic, intoxicant, or other substance 
without their prior knowledge or consent.  The other would find the same 
individual mentally incapacitated if he or she was rendered temporarily 
incapable of understanding or controlling their conduct because they either 
voluntarily ingested a narcotic, anesthetic, or an intoxicant or was 
administered a substance without their prior knowledge or consent. 
Arguably, the ambiguity created by the two diametrically opposed 
interpretations of the statute by two separate appellate courts suggests that 
statutory revision might more clearly express the intent of the Legislature. 
B. In Pari Materia as an Intrinsic Interpretive Aid 
“When attempting to discover the legislative intent, the statute must be 
read in light of the old law, the mischief sought to be eliminated and the 
proposed remedy.”76  One method of analyzing a statute is to read it in pari 
materia.  Translated from Late Latin, in pari materia literally means “[u]pon 
the same matter or subject.”77  When employed as a means of statutory 
construction, this canon provides that, “[s]tatutes that deal with the same 
matter or subject should be read [. . .] and construed together as a unitary and 
harmonious whole.”78 
 
 72   Id. 
 73   Id. (“To convey some other meaning, the Legislature would have had to insert a 
comma after ‘other substance.’”). 
 74   Id. 
 75   Id. 
 76   Correa v. Grossi, 458 N.J. Super. 571, 580 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Bd. of Ed. of Sea 
Isle City v. Kennedy, 196 N.J. 1, 13 (2008)).  
 77   In Pari Materia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979); see also 2A SUTHERLAND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.3 (7th ed. 2007) (statutes are in pari materia, pertain to the 
same subject matter, when they relate to the same person, thing or to the same class of persons 
or things).  
 78   Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 330 (2009). 
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The first reference to in pari materia by the New Jersey Judiciary seems 
to have been in 1793.79  The Supreme Court of Judicature of New Jersey 
analyzed two statutory sections, enacted at different times, concerning the 
monetary amount of a suit required to permit the collection of costs.80  The 
question before the court “depend[ed] altogether upon the construction of the 
acts of assembly upon this subject, and in forming our opinion we must be 
guided by the designs and intentions of the legislature, so far as they are to 
be gathered from expressions which they have employed.”81  The court 
noted, “[t]hese statutes being made in pari materia, are to be construed 
together.”82  According to the court, because there was “no clause in the latter 
repealing the former, we must consider it as operating to raise the sum within 
which costs are not recoverable.”83  The former statute was regarded by the 
court as “reflecting light upon the other, and explanatory of its meaning.”84  
Finding that the second suit was necessitated by the result of the first, the 
court allowed the plaintiff to recover his full cost.85 
In the recent case of Collas v. Raritan River Garage, Inc., in the context 
of an attorney fee award to a former employee’s spouse, who received a 
compensation award of dependent benefits until death or remarriage, the 
court acknowledged, “we often read statutes in pari materia to give effect to 
the Legislature’s will enacting separate laws on the same subject 
matter . . . .”86  Where the court cannot discern a link between the proffered 
statutes, the court will not infer one.87  In fact, New Jersey courts have 
expressly cautioned against the “over-reliance on maxims of statutory 
construction,” noting that “[t]he adventitious occurrence of like or similar 
phrases, or even of similar subject matter, in laws enacted for wholly 
different ends will normally not justify applying the rule 
of in pari materia construction.”88 
Along those lines is the court’s treatment of in pari materia in the case 
of Air Brook Limousine, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation.89  In Air 
Brook, the court addressed a tax dispute concerning a car service company.  
 
 79   Baracliff’s Ex’r v. Griscom’s Adm’r, 1 N.J.L. 193, 195 (1793). 
 80   Id.  
 81   Id. at 194. 
 82   Id. at 195. 
 83   Id.  
 84   Id.  
 85   Baracliff’s Ex’r v. Griscom’s Adm’r, 1 N.J.L. 193, 195–96 (1793). 
 86   Collas v. Raritan River Garage, Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 279, 283 (App. Div. 2019). 
 87   Id. (finding no link that tethers the 450-week period in N.J.S.A. 34:15-12 and portions 
of N.J.S.A. 34-15-13 to the calculation of counsel fees governed by N.J.S.A. 34:15-64). 
 88   Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 331 (2009) (quotations omitted). 
 89   Air Brook Limousine, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, No. A-3861-10T3, 2012 WL 
3166607, at *10 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 568, 65 A.3d 835 (2013). 
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It was the position of Air Brook that it was not required to pay sales and use 
tax on its vehicles.90  The Tax Court and Appellate Division disagreed, 
finding that Air Brook’s vehicles—sedans and limousines—did not qualify 
as a “bus” for tax exemption.91  N.J.S.A. 54:32B-8.28 reads, in pertinent part: 
Receipts from sales of buses for public passenger 
transportation, including repair and replacement parts and 
labor therefor, to bus companies whose rates are regulated 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Department 
of Transportation or to an affiliate of said bus companies or 
to common or contract carriers for their use in the 
transportation of children to and from school are exempt 
from the tax imposed under the Sales and Use Tax Act.92 
The Sales and Use Tax (“SUT”) Act does not define the term “bus.”93  Air 
Brook took the position that the exemption contained in the SUT Act should 
be read in pari materia with definitions contained in Title 39 (Motor 
Vehicles and Traffic Regulation) and Title 48 (Public Utilities).94 
Title 39 defines “omnibus” as a “motor vehicle used for the 
transportation of passengers for hire, except commuter vans and vehicles 
used in ridesharing arrangements and school buses.”95  Title 48 defines 
“autobus” as “any motor vehicle or motorbus operated over public highways 
or public places in this State for the transportation of passengers for hire in 
intrastate business, whether used in regular route, casino, charter or special 
bus operations, notwithstanding such motor vehicle or motorbus may be used 
in interstate commerce.”96  Although the SUT Act’s bus exemption was 
enacted almost a decade before the Title 48 “autobus” definition, both 
statutory sections were later subject to technical corrections in the same 
bill.97 
In 1990, the Legislature added a SUT Act tax exemption for 
limousines,98 which cross-referenced the Title 39 definition of “limousine,” 
but left the bus exemption untouched.  Other SUT Act exemptions make 
specific cross-reference to definitions found in other statutes.99  All of the 
 
 90   Id. at *1. 
 91   Id. at *1 and *11. 
 92   N.J.S.A. § 54:32B-8.28 (emphasis added). 
 93   Air Brook Limousine, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, No. A-3861-10T3, 2012 WL 
3166607, at *5 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 568, 65 A.3d 835 (2013). 
 94   Id. at *6 and *9. 
 95   N.J.S.A. § 39:1-1. 
 96   N.J.S.A. § 48:4-1. 
 97   Air Brook Limousine, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, No. A-3861-10T3, 2012 WL 
3166607, at *8 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 568, 65 A.3d 835 (2013). 
 98   N.J.S.A. § 54:32B-8.52 (citing N.J.S.A. 39:3-195). 
 99   See N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.6 (referring to the definition of “manufactured home” in 
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vehicles in question in the Air Brook case were registered with the State 
Motor Vehicle Commission (“MVC”) as “omnibus” vehicles, all bore 
omnibus license plates, and all carried $1.5 million in insurance as required 
by the MVC for buses.100 
The Air Brook court, however, declined to apply an in pari materia 
reading of the three statutes.  The court said that while the “SUT bus 
exemption and Titles 39 and 48 may all deal with buses, [. . .] that superficial 
overlap does not mean that they are in pari materia.”101  The court said that 
“[g]iven the risk of impinging on the legislative function, our courts consider 
it ‘better to wait for necessary corrections by those authorized to make them, 
or, in fact, for them to remain unmade, however desirable they may be.’”102 
Finally, within the Local Land and Building Laws (“LLBL”), there are 
two statutes that permit a governmental entity to lease property to private 
individuals.103  N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14 provides, in relevant part, that: 
Any county or municipality may lease any real 
property, capital improvement or personal property not 
needed for public use as set forth in the resolution or 
ordinance authorizing the lease, other than county or 
municipal real property otherwise dedicated or restricted 
pursuant to law, and except as otherwise provided by law, 
all such leases shall be made in the manner provided by this 
section. 
(a) In the case of a lease to a private person, except for 
a lease to a private person for a public purpose as provided 
in . . . (C. 40A:12-15), said lease shall be made to the highest 
bidder by open public bidding at auction or by submission 




N.J.S.A. § 54:4–1.4); N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.8 (referring to the definition of “motor fuels” in the 
Motor Fuel Tax Law, N.J.S.A. §§ 54:39–101 to –149); N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.15 (referring to 
the definition of “farming enterprise” in N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.16); N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.16 
(defining “farming enterprise”); N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.45 (referring to the definition of 
“cigarette” in the Cigarette Tax Act, N.J.S.A. §§ 54:40A–1 to –66); N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.52 
(defining “limousine” by reference to N.J.S.A. § 39:3– 9.5); N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–2(mm) 
(referring to the definition of “mobile communications services” in 4 U.S.C. § 124). 
 100   Air Brook Limousine, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, No. A-3861-10T3, 2012 WL 
3166607, at *4 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 568, 65 A.3d 835 (2013). 
 101   Air Brook Limousine, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, No. A-3861-10T3, 2012 WL 
3166607, at *10 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 568, 65 A.3d 835 (2013). 
 102   Id. at *7 (quoting R.R. Comm’n v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 100 N.E. 852, 855 
(Ind. 1913)). 
 103   See N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14 and N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24. 
 104   N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14. 
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Historically, this statute was one of the first to mandate public bidding when 
a governmental unit proposed to lease its property to a private person.105  
Within the same chapter of the LLBL, however, N.J.S.A. 40A:4-24 provides 
that: 
Every county or municipality may lease for fixed and 
upon prescribed terms and for private purposes any of the 
land or buildings or any part thereof not presently needed 
for public use to the person who will pay the highest rent 
therefor. The use by the lessee shall be of such character as 
not to be detrimental to the building or the use of the 
building or the use of the unleased part of the building.106 
The origin of this statute can be traced to R.S. 40:60-42, which in turn 
originated with the Home Rule Act of 1917.107 
In Sellitto v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, a residential property 
owner sought injunctive relief to restrain the governmental unit from leasing 
municipal property adjacent to his land to a cellular telephone 
communications facility.108  The plaintiff alleged that the lease was null and 
void because it did not comply with the competitive bidding requirements 
set forth in the LLBL.109  The Borough argued that N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24 
allows a municipality to dispense with the public bidding requirement when 
leasing property to a private person.110  The Borough contended that if the 
Legislature had intended otherwise, N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24 would contain 
express language regarding public bidding much like the language found in 
N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14.111  The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ applications and 
concluded that N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24 permitted the lease to be executed 
without the necessity of public bidding.112  The plaintiff appealed.113 
The Appellate Division was confronted with “two statutory provisions 
which were arguably controlling, both of which were contained within the 
LLBL and which were enacted on the same day . . . .”114  The “real question,” 
 
 105   Sellitto v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 284 N.J. Super. 277, 285 (App. Div. 
1995).  
 106   N.J.S.A. 40A:4-24.  
 107   Sellitto, 284 N.J. Super. at 285. 
 108   Id. 
 109   Id. at 281–82. The plaintiff also alleged, among other things, that the borough failed 
to adhere to its own zoning ordinances by allowing a non-permitted use to be constructed in 
a residential zone. A discussion of these arguments has been omitted from this Report because 
they exceed the scope of the instant discussion.  
 110   Id. at 286. 
 111   Id. at 285. 
 112   Sellitto v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 284 N.J. Super. 277, 283–84 (App. Div. 
1995). 
 113   Id. at 284. 
 114   Id. at 285. 
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according to the Appellate Division, was whether N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14 or 
N.J.S.A. 40A:12-40(a) controls these transactions.115  In the absence of 
legislative history, the court struggled to determine the reason why two 
contradictory statutes exist within the same act.116  The court observed that: 
[O]n the same day and within the same bill[, the 
Legislature]: (1) enacted a new provision (§ 14) which set 
forth in considerable detail the procedures which had to be 
followed by a municipality when it leased its public lands 
for a private purpose; and, (2) retained an older source 
provision (§ 24) which merely required the municipality to 
find the person willing to pay the highest rent for land or 
buildings not presently needed for public use before leasing 
the property.117 
It was “not a question . . . of the more general statute yielding to the more 
specific; nor [was] it a question of the older statute yielding to the more 
recent.”118  Instead, the answer lies within the case law interpreting the LLBL 
and the Local Public Contracts Law (“LPCL”).119  The underlying purpose 
of the LPCL is to foster openness in local government activities.120  It was 
enacted to “secure competition which, in turn, works to protect the public 
against chicanery and fraud in public office.”121  To achieve the purposes of 
the Act, the LPCL envisions, with certain exceptions, a system of 
competitive bidding,122 the purpose of which is to obtain the best economic 
result for the public entity and ultimately for the taxpayer.123 
In Wasserman’s Inc. v. Middletown Twp., the New Jersey Supreme 
Court considered whether N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14 should be applied 
retroactively.124  The court noted that N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14 specifically 
replaced N.J.S.A. 40:60-42,125 but never mentioned N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24, 
 
 115   Id. at 286. 
 116   Id. 
 117   Id. at 286–87.  
 118   Sellitto v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 284 N.J. Super. 277, 287 (App. Div. 
1995). 
 119   See generally N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 to 11-49.  
 120   See Closter Service Stations, Inc. v. Comm’rs of Village of Ridgefield Park, 99 N.J. 
Super. 69, 73 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1968) (noting that the Local Public Contracts Law 
“guard[s] against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, and corruption” (citing Hillside 
Twp. v. Sternin, 25 N.J. 317 (1957)); see also Bodies by Lembo, Inc. v. County of Middlesex, 
286 N.J. Super. 298 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).  
 121   Closter Service Stations, 99 N.J. Super. at 73. 
 122   N.J. Stat. § 40A:11-13 
 123   Sellitto, 284 N.J. Super. at 287. 
 124   Wasserman’s Inc. v. Middletown Twp., 137 N.J. 238, 243 (1994). 
 125   Id. 
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despite the fact that its language is identical to that of N.J.S.A. 40:60-42.126 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Wasserman gave the Sellitto 
court pause while it considered the purpose of N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24.  
Ultimately, however, the Sellitto court made reference to the “rule of 
construction that statutes which deal with same matter or subject and seek to 
achieve the same overall legislative purpose should be read 
in pari materia most obviously applies when statutes in question were 
enacted during same session or went into effect at same time, or where they 
make specific reference to one another.”127  The court added, “if N.J.S.A. 
40:60-42 has been replaced by § 14, we cannot ascertain what purpose the 
current § 24 serves.”128  The court concluded that, “§ 14 prevails over § 24.  
Otherwise no public bidding would be required for leasing public land and 
buildings not presently needed . . . .”129  With regard to the viability of 
N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24, the court said, “[w]e cannot reconcile why the 
Legislature would adopt a statute with conflicting language.”130  The 
determination of the court appears to support a modification of the statute to 
address the conflicting language. 
Although not uniformly applauded, or applied, the doctrine remains in 
broad and current use, as is demonstrated by the fact that it has been 
referenced in more than 1,000 New Jersey cases.131  Even when the courts do 
not base their determination on an in pari materia reading of multiple 
statutory sections, the doctrine still seems to serve as a useful analytical 
paradigm. 
II. EXTRINSIC AIDS TO INTERPRETATION 
 
Chief Justice Marshall once noted that: 
 
“[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of the 
legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be 
derived.” Consonant with this idea, courts construing an 
ambiguous statute do not limit their search for legislative 
intent to sources in the published act, known as “intrinsic” 
 
 126   See Sellitto, 284 N.J. Super. at 288. 
 127   Id. (citing Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 433-34 (1975)). 
 128   Id. 
 129   Id. See also N.J. Highlands Coal. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 236 N.J. 208, 214 
(2018) (cautioning that [t]he adventitious occurrence of like or similar phrases, or even of 
similar subject matter, in laws enacted for wholly different ends will normally not justify 
applying the rule” of the [in pari materia construction]). 
 130   Id. at 289. 
 131   Westlaw search on February 25, 2020, for “in pari materia” returned a result of 1,007 
cases in New Jersey.  
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aids . . . Instead, courts also may consider sources beyond the 
printed page. These sources from outside a statute’s text are 
known as “extrinsic” aids to interpretation. Extrinsic aids 
relate to a statute’s history, and may be legislative, executive, 
judicial, or nongovernmental in origin. [footnotes omitted]132 
A. Temporal Analysis 
Intrinsic sources of statutory interpretation do not stray from the words 
of the statute.  Reliance solely on this approach, advocated by textualists, 
attempts to define the statute, and resolve any ambiguities by examining the 
text itself, without reference to external sources.133  Other options, such as 
consideration of legislative intent, are largely discounted.134 
Intentionalists, on the other hand, examine the purposes statutes were 
intended to serve by examining extrinsic sources such as legislative 
histories.135  The New Jersey Supreme Court has suggested on many 
occasions that “the goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and 
effectuate the legislature’s intent.”136 
Still others claim that neither of those approaches are reliable or 
sufficiently useful.137  Critics point out that regardless of the approach, the 
context of the potential application matters, and even then, “context” itself is 
a fraught concept which does not yield predictable results.138 
There is, however, a manner of looking at statutes without limited 
analysis of the words of the law itself, but that also avoids relying on 
secondary, perhaps subjective, sources.  An inquiry into the timing of a 
statute exemplifies such an approach and can be useful in statutory 
interpretation.  Examining the timing of a statute may help provide the 
elusive context, since one literally looks at when the statute was enacted, and 
how it interacts with other statutes dealing with the same subject. 
 
 132   § 48:1. Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 48:1 (7th ed. 2019). 
 133   ANTONIN SCALIA., COMMON-LAW COURTS IN A CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF 
UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS 17 
(Princeton University Press 1995) (“It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.” 
[emphasis in original]) 
 134   Id. at 32 (“But assuming, contrary to all reality, that the search for “legislative intent” 
is a search for something that exists, that something is not likely to be found in the archives 
of legislative history.”) 
 135   J. Clark Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Statutory Interpretation: Four Theories in 
Disarray, 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 81,86 (2000). 
 136   State v. Olivero, 221 N.J. 632, 639 (2015); see also State v. Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251, 
262 (2014); State in Interest of K.O., 217 N.J. 83, 91 (2014). 
 137   See Frank H. Easterbrook, “The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation,” 84 
U. OF CHICAGO LAW REV. 81 (2017). 
 138   Id. at 83. 
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We consider, on the following pages, the effect of timing when statutes 
contain conflicting provisions, when an enacted statute might imply repeal 
of a prior statute, when statutes are intended to apply retroactively, and when 
statutes are “borrowed” from other jurisdictions or based upon a model or 
uniform act. 
New Jersey courts use a pragmatic approach for resolving potentially 
conflicting statutes, rather than hewing to a strict ideology.  The Appellate 
Division has said that “[s]tatutes are to be read sensibly rather than 
literally.”139  The goal of our courts is always to allow for the greatest 
possible expression of legislative intent.140  They “are enjoined to reconcile 
conflicts and read the laws as consistent to give effect to both expressions of 
the Legislature’s purpose.”141  This is so even when there is a conflict 
involving the same subject.142  Statutes addressing the same area of law 
should be read together and construed together, so that neither statute is 
rendered invalid.143 
When reconciliation is not possible, courts may look to two possible 
points of distinction: specific versus general,144 and later versus earlier.145  
When one statute is specific and the other general, the specific statute will 
generally govern.146  Additionally, “[w]here two statutes deal with the same 
subject matter, the more recent enactment prevails as the latest expression of 
legislative will.”147  New Jersey courts recognize that where a later act 
“covers the whole subject” that was addressed by an earlier act, the 
“inescapable conclusion” is that the Legislature intended for the later act to 
control.148  These canons may be employed in a single instance to achieve 
 
 139   Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Bryan, 388 N.J. Super. 550, 557 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), 
citing New Jersey State League of Municipalities v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 310 N.J. Super. 
224, 234 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). 
 140   New Jersey State League of Municipalities v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 310 N.J. Super. 
224, 234 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), ref. State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406, 422 (1994) (“[I]n 
times when plain language creates uncertainties, courts must construe the statute in a manner 
that best effectuates the Legislature’s intent.”). 
 141   New Jersey State League of Municipalities v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 310 N.J. Super. 
224, 234 (App. Div. 1998). 
 142   Id. 
 143   Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 330 (2009). 
 144   Williams v. American Auto Logistics, 226 N.J. 117, 127 (2016). 
 145   Kemp by Wright v. State, County of Burlington, 147 N.J. 294, 306-7 (1997) (quoting 
NORMAN SINGER, 1A SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.09, at 338-39 (5th ed. 
1993)). 
 146   Scott v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 6 A.3d 476, 480 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2010) (citing State v. Cagno, 978 A.2d 921, 952 (App. Div. 2009)). 
 147   In re Fed.-Mogul Glob. Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 374 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing NORMAN SINGER 
& SHAMBIE SINGER, 2B SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51:2 (7th ed. 2012)). 
 148   Kemp by Wright v. State, 687 A.2d 715, 721 (N.J. 1997) (citing State v. Roberts, 123 
A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1956)). 
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the overarching goal of effectuating legislative intent. “[T]he more specific 
statute controls over the more general one, or the newer provision controls 
as the latest legislative expression[.]”149 
Even where a court finds one statute to prevail over the other, the court 
must also take care to avoid finding a repeal by implication, which is 
universally disfavored.150  “[A] court may not infer a statutory repeal ‘unless 
the later statute expressly contradict[s] the original act’ or unless such a 
construction is absolutely necessary. . . in order that [the] words [of the later 
statute] shall have any meaning at all.”151  As the New Jersey Supreme Court 
has announced, “a repeal by implication requires clear and compelling 
evidence of legislative intent.”152  Further, “such intent must be free from 
reasonable doubt.”153  Courts operate under the assumption that the 
Legislature is familiar with the laws it passes and intends for related laws to 
work together.154  Therefore, courts must apply “every reasonable 
construction” in order to avoid implied repeal.155 
Perhaps the most fundamental time-based canon of interpretation is that 
statutory law is presumed to apply prospectively.156  This principle has been 
followed since the earliest days of the common law.157  It is echoed in the Ex 
Post Facto Clause of our Constitution, which requires that citizens have 
notice of laws, particularly those which might impair substantive rights, and 
which limits the government’s power to enact “arbitrary and potentially 
vindictive legislation.”158  The United States Supreme Court holds as “a rule 
of general application” that retroactivity will not apply “unless such 
construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication.”159 
 
 149   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 147. 
 150   See, e.g., Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 810 (2010); New Jersey Ass’n of School 
Adm’rs v. Schundler, 49 A.3d 860, 872 (N.J. 2012). 
 151   United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 302 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Traynor v. 
Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 152   New Jersey Ass’n of School Adm’rs v. Schundler, 49 A.3d 860, 872 (N.J. 2012), 
citing Mahwah Twp. v. Bergen Cnty. Bd. of Taxation, 98 N.J. 268, 280, 486 A.2d 818, cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1136, 105 S.Ct. 2677, 86 L.Ed.2d 696 (1985). 
 153   Voss v. Tranquilino, 19 A.3d 470, 471 (N.J. 2011) (citing Twp. Of Mahwah v. Bergen 
Cty. Bd. Of Taxation, 486 A.2d 818, 825 (N.J. 1985)). 
 154   New Jersey Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs, 49 A.3d at 872. 
 155   Id. 
 156   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 147, at § 41:4. (“The rule is that statutes are prospective, 
and will not be construed to have retroactive operation unless the language employed in the 
enactment is so clear it will admit of no other construction.”). 
 157   Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994) (citing Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 842–44, 855–56 (1990)). See also 
Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). 
 158   Id. at 266–67 (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981)). 
 159   Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 37 (2006) (citing United States v. St. 
Louis, S.F. & T.R. Co., 270 U.S. 1, 3 (1926)). 
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The New Jersey Supreme Court has long recognized the problematic 
nature of retroactive statutes, as such an “application of new laws involves a 
high risk of being unfair.”160  The court declines finding retroactivity “unless 
such intention of the legislature appear clearly by its terms or by necessary 
implication.”161  Consequently, there are “well-settled rules” regarding 
retroactivity, absent clear legislative intent that a statute is to apply only 
prospectively.162 
First, and most obviously, a statute will apply retroactively where the 
Legislature has explicitly intended it.163  Such an intention may be found in 
the language of the statute, or in the pertinent legislative history.164  Second, 
retroactivity may be impliedly intended when such an approach is necessary 
to give effect to the statute or to provide a sensible interpretation.165  If the 
Legislature is silent on the subject, “a prospective intent ‘may be inferred 
from knowledge that courts generally will enforce newly enacted substantive 
statutes prospectively.’”166 
Third, retroactivity is appropriate when a statute is “ameliorative or 
curative.”167  Such a statute “is designed merely to carry out or explain the 
intent of the original statute” and does not impact “the intended scope or 
purposes of the original act.”168  An ameliorative or curative statute clarifies 
an earlier statute, but does not substantively alter it.169  Lastly, in the absence 
of a clear expression of legislative intent for it to apply prospectively, 
considerations like the expectations of the parties may warrant retroactive 
application.170  This requires looking at the reasonable expectations of the 
parties as well as the controlling law.171 
However, even if a statute is intended to apply retroactively, courts will 
still decline to do so if such an application would be unconstitutional, or if it 
would result in “manifest injustice.”172  A manifest injustice analysis 
 
 160   Gibbons v. Gibbons, 432 A.2d 80, 84 (N.J. 1981). 
 161   Deegan v. Morrow, 31 N.J.L. 136, 138 (Sup. Ct. 1864). 
 162   Gibbons, 432 A.2d. at 84. 
 163   Id. 
 164   Id. (citing, e.g., Howard Savings Institution v. Kielb, 183 A.2d 401, 404-407 (N.J. 
1962)). 
 165   Id. 
 166   Johnson v. Roselle EQ Quick LLC, 143 A.3d 254, 264 (N.J. 2016) (citing Maeker v. 
Ross, 99 A.3d 795, 802 (N.J. 2014)) [Emphasis in the original.]. 
 167   Johnson, 143 A.3d. at 264. 
 168   Id. 
 169   Id. (citing Schiavo v. John F. Kennedy Hosp., 609 A.2d 781, 783 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1992)). 
 170   Gibbons v. Gibbons, 432 A.2d 80, 85 (N.J. 1981).  
 171   Johnson, 143 A.3d. at 265. 
 172   Oberhand v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 940 A.2d 1202, 1210 (N.J. 2008) (citing 
Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assocs., 772 A.2d 368, 378 (N.J. 2001)). 
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involves “matters of unfairness and inequity[,]” specifically, an affected 
party’s reliance on prior law, and the consequences of that reliance.173 
Modeled and “borrowed” statutes are laws which are copied from other 
jurisdictions.174  When construing such statutes, the borrowing jurisdiction 
generally is assumed to accept their prior judicial interpretations.175  Other 
factors, such as the similarity of language between the original and the copy, 
may also be considered.176  Model and uniform acts are drafted by the 
Uniform Law Commission177 and by the American Law Institute.178  A 
uniform act seeks to establish the same law on a subject, and a model act 
seeks to promote uniformity (but with the understanding that the act may 
only be adopted in part); such acts strive to achieve uniformity among 
jurisdictions.179  Consonant with the idea of promoting uniformity is that 
courts will construe model and uniform acts as other adopting jurisdictions 
have done.  Courts assume that when the Legislature adopts model or 
uniform laws, the legislative intent is to accept the interpretation of the parent 
or sister jurisdictions.180  As the New Jersey Supreme Court notes, “[t]he very 
purpose of adoption of a model act is to encourage consistency in approach 
in the legislative language and its application.”181 
Thus, a temporal analysis of statutes helps shed light on legislative 
intent, thereby aiding in statutory interpretation when the text of the statute 
itself is ambiguous.  By considering when a statute was enacted and utilizing 
canons of construction that incorporate time as instructive in a statutory 
analysis, courts can resolve ambiguities and make the laws more reliable, 
and useful, to the people governed by them. 
B. Post-enactment Legislative History as an Extrinsic Interpretive 
Aid 
Extrinsic aids relate to a statute’s history, which can be divided into 
three chronological categories: pre-enactment history, enactment history, 
and post-enactment history.182  Pre-enactment history includes 
“circumstances and events leading up to a bill’s introduction.”183  Enactment 
 
 173   Id. (citing In re D.C., 679 A.2d 634, 648 (N.J. 1996) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 174   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 147, at § 52:2. 
 175   Carolene Products Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944). 
 176   Id. 
 177   Uniform Act, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 178   ALI, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/how-institute-works/. (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).  
 179   What is a Uniform Act?, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
uniformlaws.org/acts/overview/uniformacts. (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).  
 180   Id. 
 181   Thomsen v. Mercer-Charles, 901 A.2d 303, 311 (N.J. 2006). 
 182   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:1.  
 183   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:1. 
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history includes “all actions taken and statements made during legislative 
consideration of the original bill from the time of its introduction until final 
enactment.”184  Post-enactment legislative history includes “amendments and 
any other development relevant to a statute’s operation subsequent to 
enactment,”185 such as reenactments, legislative acquiescence, and judicial 
precedents.186  Courts view subsequent legislative history, or post-enactment 
history, as less illuminating than enactment history.187  However, “[w]here 
the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything 
from which aid can be derived.”188 
The legislature’s reenactment of a statute can provide extrinsic aid.  If 
the legislature reenacts a statute that contains substantially similar language 
as the original statute, it is viewed as a continuation of the original act and 
not a new enactment.189  Under such circumstances, it is presumed that the 
legislature is aware of, and has ratified, the judicial interpretations given to 
the original statute.190 
In Darel v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association Insurance 
Company, a bicyclist was injured as a result of an accident involving an 
automobile and sought personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits from the 
automobile’s insurer.191  The New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether 
the 1983 amendment to New Jersey’s No Fault Act (N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4) 
affected the eligibility requirements and the PIP benefits of the bicyclist.192  
The court determined that the 1983 amendment did not affect the benefits of 
the bicyclist.193  According to the court, the amendment affected eligibility 
requirements for only one class of pedestrians: the named insured’s family 
members who sustained bodily injury caused by the named insured’s 
automobile.194  This class excluded beneficiaries, like the bicyclist plaintiff, 
 
 184   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:1. 
 185   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:1. 
 186   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:1. 
 187   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:20; see also Solid Waste Agency of Northern 
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).  
 188   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:1, (quoting Chief Justice Marshall in U.S. v. 
Fisher, 6 U.S. 358 (1805)).  
 189   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 22:33. 
 190   Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988). 
 191   Darel v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co., 114 N.J. 416 (1989). 
 192   Id. at 419. 
 193   Id. (citing N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4. The No-Fault Act created two separate classes of 
pedestrians under the statute. The first class included the named insured or a familial member 
of the named insured’s household who sustains an injury as a result of an accident involving 
an automobile.  The second class of pedestrians, “stranger” pedestrians, who were strangers 
to the insurance contract, consisted of pedestrians who sustain bodily injury caused by the 
named insured’s automobile or are struck by an object propelled by or from such automobile. 
The plaintiff fell under the “stranger” pedestrian category). 
 194   Id. at 420–21 
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who fell under the “stranger” pedestrian category.195  “The words controlling 
the status of ‘stranger’ pedestrians are simply repeated in the amended 
version of the statute” and the statutory interpretation of the court is held to 
be valid when the legislature readopts and reenacts the language endorsed in 
previous judicial decisions.196 
In addition to reenactments, legislative acquiescence or inaction has 
been deemed to  indicate legislative approval of the application of law by 
courts and agencies.197  “The construction of a statute by the courts, 
supported by long acquiescence on the part of the Legislature, or by 
continued use of the same language or failure to amend the statute, is 
evidence that such construction is in accordance with the legislative 
intent.”198  The presumption of acquiescence can be rebutted by conflicting 
legislative and judicial history.199  It may also be asserted that the legislative 
silence was due to a lack of legislative awareness of the decisions of the 
courts. 
The United States Supreme Court has, however, relied on legislative 
inaction to interpret a statute’s ambiguity in favor of the interpretation and 
application of the statute by a court or agency.200  In Bob Jones University v. 
United States, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether 
non-profit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially discriminatory 
admission standards qualify as tax-exempt organizations under the Internal 
Revenue Code.201  In a decision rooted in congressional acquiescence, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision that such educational 
institutions do not qualify as tax-exempt organizations under § 501(c)(3).202  
The Court noted that several bills and an amendment to the relevant statute 
were introduced after IRS rulings regarding § 501(c)(3) in 1970 and 1971,203 
none of which demonstrated any effort by Congress to overturn the IRS 
 
 195   Id. 
 196   Darel v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co., 114 N.J. 416, 423 (1989) (citing 
1A Sutherland Statutory Construction §22.33 (Sands 4th ed. 1985)). 
 197   William N. Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 109 Yale Law School 
Legal Scholarship Repository (1988). 
 198   Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J. 295, 301 (1963). 
 199   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 49:08 
 200   Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 201   Id. 
 202   Id. at 623. 
 203  Id. (Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) of 1954 provided that 
“[c]orporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable. . . or 
educational proposes” are entitled to tax exemption.  However, in 1970 IRS concluded that it 
could no longer justify allowing tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) to private schools that 
practiced racial discrimination, and in 1971 issued a revenue ruling stating that private schools 
having racially discriminatory policy toward students will not be seen as “charitable” as 
defined in § 170 of IRC and 501 (c)(3)).   
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ruling.204  The Court concluded that the inaction of Congress left no doubt 
that Congress was aware of the strong public policy against granting tax 
exempt status to educational institutions with discriminatory practices.205 
It is noted that while courts may consider subsequent legislative history 
including amendments, reenactment, or legislative inaction when 
interpreting a statute, courts will not consider a legislator’s isolated remarks 
or statements subsequent to a statute’s enactment.206  In Continental Gypsum 
Co. v. Director, of Div. of Taxation, the New Jersey Tax Court observed  that 
“[s]ubsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled 
to great weight in statutory construction.”207  An individual interpretative 
statement from a member of the Assembly after the enactment of a statute, 
however, does not equate to the collective understanding of the entire New 
Jersey legislature.208 
Similarly, post-enactment statements of a legislator regarding their own 
legislative intent when they voted for a specific legislation are not assigned 
much weight by New Jersey courts.209  The limited credence is justified by 
concerns that a legislator’s statements may be influenced by interest groups 
or skewed by his or her own biases, calling into question their credibility.210  
The concept of “strength in numbers” appears to hold true in statutory 
interpretation since the Courts will give more weight to Assembly 
Statements and Committee Reports on the bill, as they represent the many 
voices of legislators involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation, 
as opposed to a single voice of a legislator.211 
In addition to subsequent legislative developments, it has been said that 
“[s]tatutory precedent grows as case precedent grows.  First, someone bolder 
than the rest marks a new course.  If the course appears satisfactory, others 
follow. Legal science calls this the doctrine of stare decisis.”212  Stare decisis 
dates back to 18th century English common law and is a Latin term meaning, 
 
 204   Id. at 600–01. 
 205   Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600–01 (1983). 
 206   Continental Gypsum Co. v. Dir, Div. of Taxation, 19 N.J. Tax 221 (2000). 
 207   Id. at 231. (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co., v. FCC, 395 U.S.367, 380–81(1969)). 
 208   Id. 
 209   See New Jersey Coalition of Health Care Professionals, Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. of 
Banking and Ins., Div. of Ins., 323 N.J. Super. 207 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
 210   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:16. 
 211   Continental Gypsum Co., 19 NJ. Tax at 231. (quoting State v. Yothers, 282 N.J. 
Super. 86, 105 (1995) (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984))).  
 212   SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 1:3. See also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
827 (1991) (The doctrine of stare decisis serve number of policy goals. The doctrine 
“promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, 
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of 
the judicial process.”). 
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“to stand by that which is decided.”213  It refers to the courts’ practice of 
following prior cases when making a ruling on a case with similar facts.214  
This common law principal promotes a respect for judicial decisions, 
uniformity, stability, and predictability in the development of legal 
principles.215  Following precedent also enhances judicial efficiency.216  
Legal questions litigated in the past allow present and future courts to decide 
similar issues by analogy, rather than by employing fresh analysis each time.  
It is also a cost-efficient method; both courts and litigating parties save 
expenses in relitigating similar issues.217  Courts have “always required a 
departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification.”218  
As Justice Cardozo explained in his treatise on the common law, “[e]very 
new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule which seems applicable 
yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered.”219 
Amendment and reenactment of a statute, legislative acquiescence, and 
judicial precedents are some of the different tools the courts utilize to assist 
in statutory interpretation.  Canons based on extrinsic sources play a crucial 
role in resolving statutory ambiguity, but the interpretive weight they merit 
is ultimately entrusted to the courts. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Although not uniformly embraced, and despite the acknowledgement 
of contradictory canons, hundreds of years of case law illustrate that the 
canons of statutory interpretation have been, and continue to be, useful 
interpretive aids for courts faced with statutory language that fails, on its 
face, to provide sufficient clarify. 
 
 
 213   Cong. Res. Serv., The Supreme Court’s Overruling of Constitutional Precedent 
(2018). 
 214   Id. 
 215   State v. Witt 223 N.J. 409, 439 (2015) (citing State v. Shannon, 210 N.J. 225, 226 
(2012)).  
 216   Cong. Res. Serv., supra note 213. 
 217   Cong. Res. Serv., supra note 213. 
 218   State v. Brown, 190 N.J. 144, 157 (2007) (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428, 443 (2000)). 
 219   Orientale v. Jennings, 239 N.J. 569, 592 (2019) (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The 
Nature of the Judicial Process 23 (1921)). 
